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Abstract
We present a novel framework for analyzing cost minimizing production be-
havior in multi-output settings. Our speciﬁc focus is on dealing with joint inputs,
i.e. inputs that are simultaneously used for the production of multiple outputs.
Here, we distinguish between two possible approaches. The cooperative approach
takes a centralized perspective and assumes cost minimization at the aggregate
ﬁrm level. By contrast, the noncooperative approach adopts a decentralized view
and assumes cost minimization at the level of the individual output departments,
which implies the possibility of free riding behavior for the joint inputs. Our
framework is non-parametric in nature, which means that it allows for analyz-
ing production behavior while avoiding (nonveriﬁable) prior functional structure
for the production technology. We show that it naturally extends the existing
nonparametric framework for analyzing single output production. We establish
rationalizability conditions for cooperative as well as noncooperative production
behavior. In addition, we introduce goodness-of-ﬁt measures for evaluating the
degree of violation of these conditions. An empirical application to the English
and Welsh drinking water and sewerage sector shows the practical usefulness of
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1our framework. Speciﬁcally, we compare the empirical validity of the cooperative
and noncooperative models for describing the observed production behavior.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C14, D21, D22, D24.
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1 Introduction
Whereas introductory economics textbooks usually focus on single output production,
most ﬁrms in real life simultaneously produce multiple outputs. To rationalize the
prevalence of such multi-output ﬁrms, economists typically invoke the possibility of joint
inputs, i.e. inputs that are simultaneously used for the production of multiple outputs.
Joint inputs explain the presence of scope economies, which form a natural economic
motivation for multi-output production. Essentially, these joint inputs have a ‘public
good’ character: they satisfy the properties of non-rivalry and non-exclusiveness in a
production setting. In the present context, non-rivalry means that using a joint input
for one output does not interfere with using the same input for another output, while
non-exclusiveness implies that no production process can be excluded from using the
joint inputs. In ﬁrm practice, examples of joint inputs are general management, brand
advertising, research and development, etc.
In what follows, we set up a framework to model multi-output production with
joint inputs. In doing so, we maintain two basic assumptions. Firstly, we assume
cost minimizing ﬁrm behavior. Cost minimization is a standard hypothesis in neo-
classical production theory. It prescribes that, for any desired level of outputs, the ﬁrm
always chooses the inputs that minimize the total cost. From a practical perspective,
the assumption of cost minimization has the advantage that it can be used even when
output prices are unavailable or of little interest to the workings of the ﬁrm (which is
the case for e.g. hospitals, non-proﬁt organization, universities or colleges, government
agencies, etc). Secondly, we assume that the ﬁrm is organized in such a way that each
department is responsible for the production of a certain output. In principle, it is
possible to relax this assumption and, for example, to consider departments that are
individually responsible for more than one output. This would not aﬀect our main
arguments, but it would substantially complicate our exposition without really adding
new insights.
Cooperative versus noncooperative cost minimization. Cost minimization usu-
ally constitutes an uncontested ﬁrm objective. However, realizing this objective might
be a daunting task, especially for multi-output production processes. Indeed, it is often
unrealistic to assume that the central ﬁrm management can consistently collect and ag-
gregate all the necessary information concerning the diﬀerent production processes. In
addition, in many practical situations it can be diﬃcult to reach the necessary agreement
in order to calculate and implement the optimal cost minimizing input allocation.
Given this, we distinguish between two possible approaches to model multi-output
2cost minimization. Each approach makes a diﬀerent assumption regarding a ﬁrm’s input
decision process. The ﬁrst approach takes a centralized perspective and assumes cost
minimization at the aggregate ﬁrm level. In this case, the central ﬁrm management
deﬁnes the input allocation that will be used for producing the target outputs. Implicitly,
this approach imposes that the diﬀerent ﬁrm departments must cooperate and therefore
we will refer to it as the ‘cooperative’ approach.
The second approach adopts a decentralized view and assumes cost minimization at
the level of the diﬀerent output departments. In this case, the central ﬁrm manage-
ment again imposes the output targets, but now each individual output department is
responsible for choosing the (cost minimizing) inputs that achieve its speciﬁc output
target. Clearly, such a set-up does not automatically imply cooperation between the
diﬀerent departments and, therefore, we call this the ‘noncooperative’ approach. More
formally, we assume that output departments reach a Nash-type equilibrium allocation
of the inputs. As we will make explicit in our theoretical discussion, such a noncoop-
erative allocation can be characterized by an ineﬃcient allocation of the joint inputs
(in contrast to the cooperative allocation). Essentially, such ineﬃciencies follow from
free-riding behavior that is typically associated with the provision of public goods (i.e.
the tragedy of the commons).
Nonparametric production analysis. In the following sections, we will develop a
methodology that allows for empirically analyzing ﬁrm behavior in terms of the cooper-
ative (centralized) and noncooperative (decentralized) multi-output production models.
In practical applications, this enables checking which of the two models best describes
the observed ﬁrm behavior. A speciﬁc feature of our analysis is that it is nonparametric
in nature. The term nonparametric here refers to the fact that our methodology abstains
from imposing any functional form on the production technology. By contrast, it solely
uses information on observed input-output combinations and associated prices in com-
bination with some basic regularity conditions (in casu continuity and quasi-concavity).
This is particularly attractive from a practical point of view, as a priori imposed para-
metric/functional structure is typically non-veriﬁable from observational data. From
this perspective, a nonparametric analysis allows us to draw more robust conclusions
regarding the empirical validity of particular behavioral (cooperative or noncooperative)
assumptions.
The nonparametric approach to analyzing production behavior was originally devel-
oped by Hanoch and Rothschild (1972), Afriat (1972), Diewert and Parkan (1983) and
Varian (1984). These authors focused on cost minimization in the case of single-output
production. We here complement these earlier studies by introducing a methodology to
analyze cost minimization in multi-output settings. The fact that our framework pro-
vides a natural extension of the existing nonparametric framework will clearly appear
from our following exposition: all our theoretical sections will start by brieﬂy recapturing
the single-output case, to subsequently introduce our generalizations that apply under
multi-output production.
3Related literature. To conclude this Introduction, we indicate two active strands
of literature that are related to the work we present here. First, the nonparametric
approach to production analysis bears a close relation to the (nonparametric) eﬃciency
measurement methodology that is often referred to as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA;
see, for example, Fried, Lovell, and Schmidt (2008) and Cook and Seiford (2009) for
recent reviews).1 DEA typically focuses on measuring production ineﬃciencies while
imposing minimal consistency conditions on the available production technology. The
main aim of our research is to provide a structural approach to modeling cost minimizing
behavior in multi-output settings. In addition, we introduce goodness-of-ﬁt measures
for evaluating the degree of violation of cost minimization. From a DEA perspective,
these goodness-of-ﬁt measures can also be interpreted as eﬃciency measures.2
Next, our following treatment of multi-output production is partly inspired on recent
work regarding the modeling of multi-person household consumption. Speciﬁcally, our
nonparametric methodology for production analysis is formally related to the methodol-
ogy for consumption analysis that was presented by Cherchye, De Rock, and Vermeulen
(2007, 2011b), for the cooperative case, and Cherchye, Demuynck, and De Rock (2011c),
for the noncooperative case.3 Here, it is also worth indicating that parametric method-
ology has been developed for modeling such multi-person household consumption. See
Chiappori (1988), Browning and Chiappori (1998) and Chiappori and Ekeland (2009),
for cooperative behavior, and Lechene and Preston (2010) and Browning, Chiappori, and
Lechène (2010), for noncooperative behavior. For example, this may provide a useful
basis for assessing multi-output cost minimization through parametric eﬃciency mea-
surement (also referred to as Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA); see Kumbhakar and
Lovell (2000)). Generally, we believe a further exploration of the link with the litera-
ture on multi-person household consumption may open up interesting new avenues for
analyzing multi-output production behavior.
Structure. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 states the
cost minimization concepts that we will use further on. Section 3 provides nonparametric
characterizations of (cooperative and noncooperative) cost minimization in multi-output
production. Section 4 presents operational methods for assessing the empirical validity
of the diﬀerent multi-output production models that we study. Speciﬁcally, it introduces
goodness-of-ﬁt measures that allow for measuring the degree to which observed behavior
1See also Banker and Maindiratta (1988) for an early study on the relationship between the non-
parametric approach to production analysis and DEA.
2Here, it is particularly useful to refer to recent work of Cherchye, De Rock, and Vermeulen (2008)
and Cherchye, De Rock, Dierynck, Roodhooft, and Sabbe (2011a). These authors present method-
ology for DEA-type eﬃciency measurement that is formally close to the methodology for analyzing
cooperative multi-output production that we present in the current paper. From this perspective, our
following exposition can also provide a fruitful basis for developing complementary DEA-type methods
for eﬃciency analysis that focus on noncooperative multi-output production.
3This formal link is analogous to the one between the nonparametric methodologies for single-output
production analysis (discussed above) and single-person consumption analysis (see, for example, Afriat
(1967) and Varian (1982)).
4is eﬀectively consistent with a particular model speciﬁcation. Section 5 demonstrates
the empirical usefulness of our methodology through an application to the English and
Welsh drinking water and sewerage sector. As we will explain, the issue of multi-output
production, with jointly used inputs (and possible scope economies), is particularly
relevant for this sector. We will compare the empirical validity of the cooperative and
noncooperative models for describing the observed multi-output production behavior.
Finally, Section 6 summarizes and oﬀers a concluding discussion.
2 Cost minimization: deﬁnitions
This section introduces some necessary notation and deﬁnitions. We ﬁrst deﬁne the pro-
duction technology, which characterizes the feasible input-output combinations. Next,
we present the diﬀerent notions of cost minimization that will return in our following
exposition. To set the stage, we begin by considering cost minimization in the simplest
case, with single-output ﬁrms. Subsequently, we consider multi-output cost minimiza-
tion. Here, we distinguish between cooperative and noncooperative input use.
Production technology. We consider ﬁrms that produce J outputs by using N
output-speciﬁc inputs and M joint inputs. As indicated in the Introduction, joint inputs
are simultaneously used for the production of multiple outputs. By contrast, output-
speciﬁc inputs can only beneﬁt individual outputs; these inputs need to be distributed
over the J outputs. Formally, the vector q   RN
  represents the output-speciﬁc inputs,
Q   RM
  denotes the joint inputs and y   RJ
  the outputs. Each vector q can be
split into J separate vectors q ;:::;qJ (i.e. q  
∑
j q
j), with every qj capturing the
output-speciﬁc inputs that are used for the production of output j. Further, we denote
by p the price (row) vector for the output-speciﬁc inputs and by P   RM
   the price
(row) vector for the joint inputs. Finally, for any vector x, we denote the kth element by
 x k. For example, the price for the mth joint input will be denoted by  P m. For con-
venience, however, we also use the notation yj to represent the level of the jth output,
i.e. yj not    y j.
We assume that a ﬁrm’s production technology can be represented by J continuous,
strictly increasing and quasi-concave production functions fj (j   J), where fj qj;Q 
gives the maximal level of output j that can be produced with the input vector  qj;Q   
R
N M




j   
{
 q






j;Q    y
j}
:
This set contains all combinations of inputs that can produce at least the amount yj of
output j. As fj is continuous and quasi-concave, we have that every set V j is closed
and convex.
In empirical applications, we typically do not observe the production functions fj
(or the sets V j). Nonparametric production analysis (only) uses technology information
5that is revealed by a ﬁnite set of observed input-output combinations. In our setting,
we assume that this data set contains information on the input prices, input quantities
and output quantities. Formally, we denote this data set by S    pt; Pt; qt; Qt; yt t T.
Here, T is the (ﬁnite) set of production observations. For each observation t   T,
 pt;Pt    R
N M
   gives the input prices,  qt;Qt    R
N M
  the input quantities, and
yt   RJ
  the output quantities. In practice, the production observations pertain to a
single ﬁrm that is observed over time (under a constant production technology) or to a
cross-section of ﬁrms facing the same production technology at a given point of time.
In what follows, we will introduce a framework for analyzing cost minimization of
individual production observations t (rather than of the full set of observations S). This
focus is motivated by the fact that individual cost minimization is usually the most
relevant concept in practical applications. For example, this is the case in a cross-
section setting where diﬀerent observations pertain to diﬀerent ﬁrms (as in our own
application in Section 5). Clearly, our following cost minimization analysis can be easily
extended to apply to the full set S: essentially, for this set S to be consistent with
cost minimization it is required that all observations t in S are simultaneously cost
minimizing. For compactness, however, we will not explicitly consider such extensions
in the sequel.
Single-output production. We ﬁrst deﬁne cost minimization for the single-output
case, i.e. J    . This is the situation that was originally considered by Hanoch and
Rothschild (1972), Afriat (1972), Diewert and Parkan (1983) and Varian (1984). It will
provide a useful starting point for our following discussion of the multi-output case.
Admittedly, when ﬁrms produce only one output the distinction between output-speciﬁc
and joint inputs becomes artiﬁcial. Still, we choose to maintain the distinction here to
ease our exposition and to avoid an overload of notation.
Consider a ﬁrm that produces the (single) output quantity y, and let f and V rep-
resent the relevant production function and corresponding input requirement set. The
ﬁrm is then said to be cost minimizing if, for input prices  p;P , it chooses the inputs
 q;Q  that solve the optimization problem (OP-S)
 q;Q          
 x;X  RN+M
+
px   PX s.t.  x;X    V  y :
As indicated above, nonparametric production analysis starts from a ﬁnite set of
production observations. In this case, we have a data set S    pt; Pt; qt; Qt; yt t T, with
yt the (one-dimensional) output quantity produced at t. Then, a production observation
t is rationalizable if its behavior is consistent with (single-output) cost minimization.
Deﬁnition 1 (S-rationalizability). Consider a data set S    pt; Pt; qt; Qt; yt t T.
We say that the observation t   T is single-output (S) rationalizable if there exists a
continuous, strictly increasing and quasi-concave production function f such that
1. for all v   T,  qv;Qv    V  yv ,
62.  qt;Qt  solves OP-S given the input prices pt;Pt, the production function f and
the output level yt.
In this deﬁnition, the ﬁrst condition requires that the function f (and set V ) is
such that every observed input-output combination is also technologically feasible. The
second condition then imposes cost minimizing behavior at the production observation
t.
Cooperative multi-output production. Let us then consider cost minimization
under multi-output production, where the distinction between output-speciﬁc and joint
inputs becomes relevant. We ﬁrst focus on the situation with outputs produced in a
cooperative way (or, production decisions are centralized).
Speciﬁcally, we assume a ﬁrm that is divided in J departments, where each depart-
ment j is responsible for the production of the jth output. Cooperative multi-output
production then means that the input quantities are chosen such that the ﬁrm as a






J;Q          





j   PX s.t.  x
j;X    V
j y
j    j   J :
We can now introduce our rationalizability concept for cooperative multi-output
production.
Deﬁnition 2 (CM-rationalizability). Consider a data set S    pt; Pt; qt; Qt; yt t T.
We say that the observation t   T is cooperative multi-output (CM) rationalizable if
there exist J continuous, strictly increasing and quasi-concave production functions fj
such that




v   qv, such
that  qj
v;Qv    V j yj
v  for all j   J,
2.  q 
t;:::;qJ
t ;Qt  solves OP-CM given the input prices pt;Pt, the production func-
tions fj (j   J) and the output vector yt.
Just like for the single-output case, the ﬁrst condition imposes technological feasibil-
ity of all observed input-output combinations, while the second condition requires cost
minimization (under cooperation) at the observation t.
Noncooperative multi-output production. To conclude this section, we consider
the case in which the multiple outputs are produced in a noncooperative way. As dis-
cussed in the Introduction, this can be interpreted in terms of a ﬁrm that decentralizes
the cost minimization decisions, such that each individual department j is responsible
for its own expenses on both the output-speciﬁc and the joint inputs. In this case, we
7assume Nash-type equilibrium behavior where each department minimizes the cost of
producing its own output given the input decisions of the other departments.
Formally, to distinguish between the joint input purchases of the diﬀerent depart-
ments, we use the vectors Qj   RM
  (j   J) to represent the joint inputs purchased by
every department j. The total amount of joint inputs at the aggregate ﬁrm level then
equals
∑
j Qj   Q. Noncooperative (Nash-type) production behavior requires that, for
each department j, the inputs  qj;Qj  solve (OP-NM)
 q
j;Q
j          
 xj;Xj  RN+M
+
px














i.e. each output department j purchases output-speciﬁc inputs qj and joint inputs Qj
that imply cost minimization given the joint inputs
∑
k̸ j Qk purchased by the other
departments k.
This leads to the following rationalizability condition for noncooperative multi-output
production.
Deﬁnition 3 (NM-rationalizability). Consider a data set S    pt; Pt; qt; Qt; yt t T.
We say that the observation t   T is noncooperative multi-output (NM) rationalizable if
there exist J continuous, strictly increasing and quasi-concave production functions fj
such that




v   qv, such
that  qj
v;Qv    V j yj
v  for all j   J,










t  (j   J)
solves OP-NM given the input prices pt;Pt, the production functions fj, the
output vector yt and the joint input vectors Qk
t (k ̸  j).
3 Cost minimization: characterizations
We are now in a position to deﬁne the nonparametric conditions for cost minimizing
behavior as deﬁned in the previous section. Essentially, these characterizations allow
us to check rationalizability while avoiding the speciﬁcation of the production functions
fj (or the sets V j). We can test cost minimizing behavior by only using the observed
information in the data set S. This is particularly convenient from a practical point of
view because, as argued above, the exact production technology (and thus the production
functions) are typically not observed in empirical applications. In Section 4, we will
show that our following characterizations of cost minimization are easily implemented
in practical analysis.
Single-output production. We ﬁrst concentrate on the single-output conditions in
Deﬁnition 1. We recall that in this case the empirical analyst can use a data set S    pt;
8Pt; qt; Qt; yt t T, where each yt represents the (one-dimensional) output produced at
the observation t.
We will need the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 4 (SACM). Consider a data set S    pt; Pt; qt; Qt; yt t T. We say that
the observation t   T satisﬁes the Strong Axiom of Cost Minimization (SACM) if, for
all v   T,
ptqv   PtQv   ptqt   PtQt whenever yv   yt and (sacm.1)
ptqv   PtQv > ptqt   PtQt whenever yv > yt: (sacm.2)
This SACM condition has two components. The ﬁrst component (sacm.1) implies
consistency with the so-called Weak Axiom of Cost Minimization (WACM; see Varian
(1984)). The additional component (sacm.2) is a technical requirement that guarantees
continuity of the production function (for S-rationalizability). The SACM condition has
a clear interpretation in terms of cost minimizing behavior. For a given observation t,
it imposes that if we observe a higher output at observation v (i.e. yv    >  yt), then
the cost of producing this higher output must be above the one of producing yt (i.e.
ptqv   PtQv    >  ptqt   PtQt). Obviously, if it were cheaper to produce a higher
output yv, then the ﬁrm could not be cost minimizing by choosing  qt;Qt : purchasing
the inputs  qv;Qv  would have produced at least the same output at a lower cost.
The following result states that data consistency with SACM is necessary and suﬃ-
cient for cost minimization in the single-output case (see Varian (1984) for a proof).
Theorem 1. Consider a data set S    pt; Pt; qt; Qt; yt t T. The observation t is then
S-rationalizable if and only if it satisﬁes SACM.
This theorem provides an easy way to nonparametrically verify whether a particular
ﬁrm observation is cost minimizing: checking the SACM condition in Deﬁnition 4 only
requires checking linear inequalities that use information captured by the observed set
S.
Cooperative multi-output production. Using the SACM concept in Deﬁnition 4,
we can next characterize cost minimizing behavior in the case of multi-output production
(in casu with S    pt; Pt; qt; Qt; yt t T). Speciﬁcally, we will obtain that cost mini-
mization again requires data consistency with SACM, but now we get a separate SACM
condition for each of the J outputs. As we will indicate, the speciﬁcity of these output-
speciﬁc SACM conditions is that they require using output-speciﬁc prices for evaluating
the joint inputs. The essential diﬀerence between the cooperative and noncooperative
case then pertains to the deﬁnition of these output-speciﬁc prices.
Let us ﬁrst consider the nonparametric condition for cost minimization that applies
to the cooperative case. (The Appendix contains the proofs of our main theorems.)
Theorem 2. Consider a data set S    pt; Pt; qt; Qt; yt t T. Then, the observation
t is CM-rationalizable if and only if, for all v   T and j   J, there exist input vectors
qj
v   RN
  and price vectors P
j
t   RM
   such that
91. for all v   T:
∑
j qj





t   Pt,
3. for all v   T and j   J:
ptq
j
v   P
j
tQv   ptq
j




















The third condition of Theorem 2 shows that CM-rationalizability of a production
observation t requires single-output rationalizability (or S-rationalizability) for each in-
dividual output separately (i.e. SACM). However, the crucial diﬀerence with the charac-
terization in Theorem 1 pertains to the costs that are allocated to the diﬀerent outputs.
First of all, the cost of output-speciﬁc inputs is distributed over the output departments
according to the vectors qj
v deﬁned in the ﬁrst condition of Theorem 2. Next, for the
joint inputs, we should account for output-speciﬁc prices. In the cooperative case that we
consider here, these output-speciﬁc prices P
j
t must sum to the observed input prices Pt;
this is guaranteed by the second condition of Theorem 2. As such, the output-speciﬁc
prices have a similar interpretation as Lindahl prices in the case of eﬃcient public goods
provision (which equally requires that Lindahl prices sum to the market prices of the
public goods). This directly complies with the public good interpretation of the joint
inputs that we discussed in the Introduction. Like Lindahl prices, the output-speciﬁc
prices P
j
t correspond to the marginal production of output j (expressed in monetary
terms) that follows from an additional unit of the joint inputs.
Given all this, we can also provide a decentralized representation of cost minimization
under cooperative behavior (which parallels the decentralized representation of eﬃcient
public goods provision under Lindahl prices). In this representation, the central ﬁrm
management ﬁrst sets out the output target for each output department, which deﬁnes
the quantities y
j
t. In a following step, it then requires every department to produce this
output at a minimal cost (i.e. each department separately solves OP-S) given the prices
pt for the output-speciﬁc inputs and the prices P
j
t for the joint inputs (i.e. department
j pays its marginal valuation  P
j





t   Pt then eﬀectively implies an eﬃcient allocation of the





just equals its expense (= Pt). This sum constraint will imply a main diﬀerence with
our characterization of cost minimizing production behavior in the noncooperative case.
As a consequence, we will obtain that noncooperative behavior can lead to ineﬃcient
purchases of the joint inputs.
Noncooperative multi-output production. Let us then regard the noncooperative
situation. Here, we get a characterization that looks very similar to the one for the
cooperative situation. But, as indicated above, an important diﬀerence pertains to the
output-speciﬁc prices for the joint inputs.
10We obtain the following nonparametric characterization of cost minimization under
noncooperative production.
Theorem 3. Consider a data set S    pt; Pt; qt; Qt; yt t T. Then, the observation
t is NM-rationalizable if and only if, for all v   T and j   J, there exist input vectors
qj
v   RN
  and price vectors P
j
t   RM
   such that
1. for all v   T:
∑
j qj
v   qv,
2. for all m   M:    j  P
j
t m     Pt m,
3. for all v   T and j   J:
ptq
j
v   P
j
tQv   ptq
j




















Thus, the characterization of NM-rationalizability is almost identical to the one of
CM-rationalizability. The only diﬀerence is that the output-speciﬁc prices P
j
t are now
replaced by the vectors P
j
t, which are subject to the max constraints embedded in the
second condition of Theorem 3. In words, such a max constraint imposes, for each joint
input m, that the highest output-speciﬁc price (deﬁned over all outputs j) must equal





(which contrasts with the second condition of Theorem 2).
Similar to before, we can interpret the output-speciﬁc prices P
j
t as representing the
marginal production of output j (in monetary terms) associated with one additional unit




t m >  P m implies that the total value added (summed
over all outputs j) associated with a one unit increase of the mth joint input exceeds
the corresponding input price. In turn, this means that the purchased amount of this
joint input is below its eﬃciency level. The reason for this ineﬃciency is the free-riders
problem that is intrinsic to noncooperative (Nash-type) equilibrium behavior.
In fact, it can be shown that every output department j for which the output-
speciﬁc input price  P
j
t m is below the actual price  Pt m will abstain from contributing
to this joint input (i.e.  Q
j
t m    ). In other words, this department is eﬀectively
free-riding on the other departments k (̸  j  that do contribute to the joint input
(because  Pk
t m    Pt m). Intuitively, in a (decentralized) noncooperative setting, a
cost minimizing output department j has every incentive not to contribute to the joint
input m (i.e.  Q
j
t m    ) if some other department k already purchased the input
amount (i.e.  Qk




Non-nestedness. To conclude this section, we show that CM-rationalizability is non-
nested with (or independent from) NM-rationability: a data set S that satisﬁes the
nonparametric conditions for the cooperative model does not necessarily satisfy the ones
for the noncooperative model, and vice versa. In particular, Examples 1 and 2 show that
11there is neither any inclusion nor any exclusion relation between the collection of data
sets that satisfy the conditions in Theorem 2 and the collection of data sets that satisfy
the conditions in Theorem 3.
This non-nestedness/independence conclusion is particularly interesting from an em-
pirical point of view. It directly follows that we will not have ‘by construction’ that
one model obtains a better empirical ﬁt than the other, simply because it has weaker
empirical implications. In our opinion, this eﬀectively makes that we can meaningfully
compare the empirical validity of the two model speciﬁcations by using our nonparamet-
ric conditions. It may actually well be that the appropriate model speciﬁcation varies
depending on the particular ﬁrm observation at hand.
Two ﬁnal observations pertain to the data sets we use in Examples 1 and 2. Firstly,
these examples show that we can meaningfully test data consistency with a speciﬁc
model (and compare the empirical validity of diﬀerent models) even if only a few ob-
servations are available. Secondly, because all inputs are joint in both examples, such
an empirical analysis in principle does not require output-speciﬁc inputs. In fact, using
similar arguments as in Examples 1 and 2, we can show that non-nestedness also applies
in the case with (only) a single joint input, provided there is at least one output-speciﬁc
input.4 Our application in Section 5 actually considers such a situation with a single
joint input.
Example 1. We ﬁrst construct a data set S that is NM-rationalizable but not CM-
rationalizable. This data set includes 2 observations (  T     ), 2 outputs (J    ), and
3 joint inputs (M    ):











































For this set S we have that P Q      , which is greater than P Q      . If we combine
this with the fact that production observation 1 produces more of both outputs than
observation 2, we conclude from Theorem 2 that this data set is not CM-rationalizable:
any possible speciﬁcation of the output-speciﬁc prices P 
  and P 
  gives either P 
 Q  <
P 
 Q  (while y 
  > y 
 ) or P 
 Q  < P 
 Q  (while y 
  > y 
 ).
Next, we can easily verify that the following speciﬁcation of the vectors P
j
t (j    ; ;
t    ; ) makes the set S satisfy the conditions in Theorem 3:
P
 











































Thus, we conclude that the data set is NM-rationalizable.
4These example are available from the authors upon request. For compactness, we do not include
them here.
12Example 2. We next present a data set S that is CM-rationalizable but not NM-
rationalizable. This data set includes 3 observations (  T     ), 2 outputs (J    ), and
3 joint inputs (M    ):

































































This set S does not satisfy the conditions in Theorem 3. The reason is that, for any
possible speciﬁcation of the output-speciﬁc prices associated with observation 2, we have
either  P 
         or  P 
        . Then, for  P 
         we get P 
 Q  < P 
 Q  (while
y 
  > y 
 ) and, similarly, for  P 
         we get P 
 Q  < P 
 Q  (while y 
  > y 
 ).
Next, we can easily verify that the following speciﬁcation of the vectors P
j
t (j    ; ;
t    ; ; ) makes the set S satisfy the conditions in Theorem 2:
P
 

































































Thus, we conclude that the data set is CM-rationalizable.
4 Goodness-of-ﬁt measures
The rationalizability conditions presented in the previous section are ‘sharp’ ones: they
(only) tell us whether or not observed behavior is exactly consistent with cost minimiza-
tion. In practice, however, it may well be that a certain ﬁrm is close to cost minimization
while it is not exactly cost minimizing. As noted by Varian (1990), for most purposes
nearly optimizing behavior is just as good as exactly optimizing behavior. This calls
for a goodness-of-ﬁt measure that tells us how close observed ﬁrm behavior is to cost
minimization if it fails the (exact) rationalizability conditions presented above. Such a
goodness-of-ﬁt measure then captures the degree of optimization (also referred to as the
degree of eﬃciency) in terms of the behavioral model that is subject to study.
Varian (1990) (based on Afriat (1972)) proposed a nonparametric goodness-of-ﬁt
measure for cost minimization in a single-output setting. In what follows, we will ex-
tend this idea to our multi-output setting. In this respect, it is also useful to refer
to Färe and Grosskopf (1995), who make explicit the relationship between Varian’s
goodness-of-ﬁt approach and the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) literature that we
also mentioned in the Introduction. Building on these authors’ analysis, our following
discussion may provide a useful starting point for exploring new directions of DEA-type
eﬃciency measurement in multi-output settings.
13Single-output production. As an introduction to the type of nonparametric goodness-
of-ﬁt analysis that we consider here, we brieﬂy recapture Varian (1990)’s original idea
and adapt it to our set-up. We start by deﬁning the concept of -S-rationalizability.
Deﬁnition 5 (-S-Rationalizability). Consider a data set S    pt; Pt; qt; Qt; yt t T and
a number      ;  . We say that the observation t   T is single-output -rationalizable
(-S-rationalizable) if there exists a c   R  that solves (for all v   T)
ptqv   PtQv   c whenever yv   yt, (fp-s)
ptqv   PtQv > c whenever yv > yt,
 ptqt   PtQt    c:
According to this deﬁnition, the observation t is -S-rationalizable if there exists a
number c that meets a number of linear constraints. The ﬁrst two constraints imply
that c does not exceed the (minimal) cost level associated with any observation v that
produces at least the output of observation t (i.e. yv    >  yt). Next, the last constraint
imposes a lower bound an c, stating that it cannot lie below  times the cost level of
observation t. Taken together, -S-rationalizability requires that the production cost of
observation t is not greater than  =       times the minimal cost for producing the
output yt as deﬁned over the set of observations T.
The condition for -S-rationalizability in Deﬁnition 5 bears a direct relation to the
S-rationalizability condition in Theorem 1. For      we have that -S-rationalizability
exactly coincides with S-rationalizability (i.e. the constraints in Deﬁnition 5 boil down
to requiring that observation t satisﬁes SACM). More generally, the higher , the ‘closer’
the (-S-rationalizable) observation t will be to S-rationalizability.
For any given value of , -S-rationalizability basically requires feasibility of a set of
linear constraints. Using this, we can introduce an easily implementable nonparametric
goodness-of-ﬁt measure for cost minimization in the single-output case. Speciﬁcally,
consider the linear programming problem that maximizes c subject to the constraint






ptqt   PtQt
:
By construction, for any  < S
t it holds that the observation t is -S-rationalizable.
In addition, the goodness-of-ﬁt measure S
t never exceeds one, and it is equal to unity
only if the observation t exactly satisﬁes the SACM condition. As such, this measure
eﬀectively captures how close the ﬁrm observation is to cost minimization.
Cooperative multi-output production. We next extend this goodness-of-ﬁt idea
to a cooperative multi-output setting. To this end, we focus on the decentralized in-
terpretation of the cooperative production model, which makes use of output-speciﬁc
quantities q
j
t and output-speciﬁc prices P
j
t for the joint inputs. Speciﬁcally, at the co-
operative equilibrium, each output department acts as if it chooses the inputs q
j
t and Qt
that solve the cost minimization problem OP-S for given output y
j
t and prices pt, P
j
t.
This motivates the following deﬁnition.
14Deﬁnition 6 (-CM-rationalizability). Consider a data set S    pt; Pt; qt; Qt; yt t T
and a number      ;  . We say that the observation t   T is cooperative multi-output
-rationalizable (-CM-rationalizable) if there exist cj   R , P
j
t   RM
   and qj
v   RN
 








t   Pt, (cm-2)
ptq
j
v   P
j
tQv   c
j whenever y
j

















The interpretation is analogous to the one of Deﬁnition 5. The speciﬁcity of Deﬁni-
tion 6 reﬂects the decentralized representation of cooperative multi-output production.
In particular, for -CM-rationalizability we need for each output j that there exists a
number cj satisfying a number of constraints. The ﬁrst two constraints in Deﬁnition
6 put restrictions on the quantities (qj
v) and the output-speciﬁc prices (P
j
t), which are
speciﬁc to the cooperative model. The next two constraints require that no cj exceeds
the cost level (for output j) for any observation v that produces at least the same amount
of output j as observation t (i.e. yj
v    >  y
j
t). Finally, the last constraint imposes that
the total production cost of observation t must not exceed  = times the minimal cost of
producing the (multi-dimensional) output associated with observation t, where the ref-
erence (minimal) cost
∑
j cj is deﬁned over the set of observations T. Like before, we get
that the condition for -CM-rationalizability reduces to the one for CM-rationalizability
(in Theorem 2) if     ; and, more generally, lower values for  imply less stringent
rationalizability requirements.
Similar to the single-output case, we can check -CM-rationalizability by verifying
feasibility of a set of linear constraints, which actually suggests an easy-to-use goodness-
of-ﬁt measure. Speciﬁcally, we solve the linear programming problem that maximizes ∑
j cj subject to (cm-1), (cm-2) and (cm-3). For
∑
j cj  the optimal value of the problem,






ptqt   PtQt
:
Once more, this measure is situated between zero and one. And we have that the
observation t will be -CM-rationalizable whenever  < CM
t . In eﬀect, CM
t measures
the degree to which the ﬁrm under study is cost minimizing at the observation t under
the assumption of cooperative multi-output production.
Noncooperative multi-output production. For the noncooperative multi-output
production setting, we construct a similar goodness-of-ﬁt measure as for the cooperative
15case. In the noncooperative equilibrium, each output department chooses the inputs q
j
t





t. We recall that an important diﬀerence with the cooperative scenario is that the
output-speciﬁc prices for the joint inputs (P
j
t) need not sum to the observed market
prices. Speciﬁcally, we now get the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 7 (-NM-rationalizability). Consider a data set S    pt; Pt; qt; Qt; yt t T
and a number      ;  . We say that the observation t   T is noncooperative multi-
output -rationalizable (-NM-rationalizable) if there exist cj   R , P
j
t   RM
   and
qj
v   RN




v   qv, (nm-1)
   j  P
j
t m     Pt m for all m   M, (nm-2)
ptq
j
v   P
j
tQv   c
j whenever y
j


























This deﬁnition has exactly the same interpretation as Deﬁnition 6, except for one
subtle (but important) diﬀerence. As indicated above, in the noncooperative case the
output-speciﬁc prices P
j
t are no longer subject to a sum constraint (i.e. cm-2 in Deﬁnition
6). Instead, we now get the max constraint (nm-2).
Given Deﬁnition 7, we can deﬁne a goodness-of-ﬁt measure in an analogous way as
for the cooperative case. Speciﬁcally, we let
∑
j cj  represent the outcome of maximizing
∑
j cj subject to the constraints (nm-1), (nm-2) and (nm-3), and let P
 j
t be the optimal
value of P
j












Once more, we have NM
t     ;   by construction. Generally, the value of this goodness-
of-ﬁt measure reveals the degree to which the observed production behavior is -NM-
rationalizable.5
As a ﬁnal remark, we note that the constraint (nm-2) is nonlinear, which means
that feasibility of the constraints in Deﬁnition 7 cannot be veriﬁed through linear pro-
gramming methods. However, we can check feasibility by using standard mixed integer
programming methods. Speciﬁcally, the max constraint (nm-2) is equivalent to the re-
quirement that there exist binary variables zj
m     ;   such that, for all m   M and
5We have to note though that there is a subtle diﬀerence between the denominators of CM
t and
NM
t . By construction the optimal values for the P
j
t add up to the observed price Pt, which makes
that the denominator of CM
t is equal to the observed cost ptqt +PtQt. Because of constraint (nm-2),
this does not need to hold for the denominator of NM
t .
16j   J,
 P
j
t m    Pt m    ;
 Pt m    P
j
t m        z
j




m    :
It is easily veriﬁed that, for every joint input m, these constraints guarantee  P
j
t m  
 Pt m for all j, while  Pt m    P
j
t m for at least one j (with zj
m    ). Thus, re-
placing constraint (nm-2) by these mixed integer linear constraints eﬀectively obtains
a mixed integer programming problem. In turn, this provides an easy way to compute
the goodness-of-ﬁt measure NM
t .
5 Empirical Application
We apply our newly proposed methodology to the English and Welsh (E&W) drinking
water and sewerage sector. We will start by brieﬂy introducing the sector. Here, it
is indicated that multi-output production and joint input use (with, correspondingly,
possible scope economies) form important issues in modeling the production behavior.
Next, we present the data (including the input and output selection) that are used in
the application. After that, we discuss our empirical results. First, we assess whether
the cooperative model or the noncooperative model does the better job in explaining the
observed behavior in our sample. Subsequently, we conduct an explanatory analysis that
correlates the goodness-of-ﬁt (or eﬃciency) measures that we obtain for the two models
with alternative contextual variables that have been studied in the relevant literature.
The E&W drinking and sewerage sector. Multi-output production has recently
become an important issue in the privatized E&W drinking water and sewerage sec-
tor (see Ofwat (2008)). In 1974, the majority of municipal drinking water companies
were merged and nationalized into 10 ‘Regional Water Authorities’ (RWAs), which were
responsible for water quality, drinking water production, distribution and sanitation.
These water and sewerage companies (WSCs) account for about 80% of the water pro-
vision.6 The Water Act, issued under the Tatcher government, privatized the RWAs in
1989.
To avoid monopoly proﬁts in a privatized environment, a strong economic regulator
has been established: the Oﬃce of Water Services (Ofwat). Ofwat applies a price-cap
regulation which limits the annual growth rate of the water price for every company
by a factor K (RPI-X). The variable K is calculated as the growth rate of the Retail
Prices Index (RPI) minus a productivity factor X, which is determined by comparing
the performances of the water utilities. The ﬁrm-speciﬁc maximum price is determined
6Besides the RWAs, about 30 ‘Water only Companies’ (WoCs) produced and distributed (only)
drinking water. For simplicity we do not focus on WoCs in our analysis below.
17once in each regulatory cycle, which consists of ﬁve years (although initially intended to
last for 10 years).
Besides setting tariﬀs, Ofwat determines the industry structure. Recently, it consid-
ered the beneﬁts of increased competition by separated companies (see Ofwat (2008)) as
a response to the so-called ‘Cave report’ (see Cave (2009)). Both vertical separation of
elements in the supply chain (e.g. separating abstraction, treatment and distribution)
and horizontal unbundling of WSCs could create a more competitive environment. As
a drawback, existing scope economies would be lost. Despite the fact that joint water
and sewerage companies service about 80% of the E&W population, the literature is in-
conclusive on the existence of scope economies. Some studies ﬁnd diseconomies of scope
(Hunt and Lynk (1995) and Saal and Parker (2000) for E&W; Marques and De Witte
(2010) for the Portuguese water sector) while other studies conclude the opposite (Lynk
(1993) and Stone and Webster (2004) in E&W but only if water quality is accounted
for).
Importantly, our methodology does not require us to take a prior stance to whether
or not scope economies are eﬀectively present. Instead, it allows us to focus upon the
cooperative versus noncooperative nature of joint input use. Our speciﬁc interest is in
identifying which model best describes the observed production behavior. Clearly, a
better understanding of the behavioral model that underlies the observed multi-output
production can only beneﬁt the regulatory policy (in casu by Ofwat).
Data. Our selection of the output-speciﬁc inputs falls in line with the existing lit-
erature (see, for example, Stone and Webster (2004)). First, for water production we
include the number of employees assigned to drinking water production, distribution
and puriﬁcation, as well as the total length of the network. Similarly, for sewerage the
output-speciﬁc inputs consist of the number of employees in sewerage collection and pu-
riﬁcation, as well as the length of the sewerage network, which is considered as a proxy
for capital use.
Next, we use the number of employees that produce both water and sewerage as a
joint input. Although this input is not directly observed from the annual accounts, we
can deduce it from the ﬁnancial statements. In particular, the Ofwat June returns report
the ‘Water direct costs to employment’, the ‘Sewerage direct costs to employment’ as
well as the ‘Total manpower costs’. This allows us to retrieve the employment shares
that are speciﬁc to water and sewerage production as well as the share of employment
that is simultaneously used for both outputs.
As outputs, we consider the measured volume of water and sewerage. Here, we
can reasonably argue that companies eﬀectively aim at producing these (exogenously
deﬁned) outputs at a minimal cost. In other words, our behavioral assumption of cost
minimization is a plausible one for the setting at hand.
The data we use arise from the Ofwat June returns, which is a public database with
detailed information on the water and sewerage companies. Our data cover the period
from 1991 (two years after privatization) to 2009. This obtains data on 4 regulatory
cycles: we have 40 production observations in 1991-1994 and 50 observations in the sub-
18sequent regulatory cycles 1995-1999, 2000-2004, and 2005-2009. Our sample comprises
190 WSC production observations in total. Table 1 provides summary statistics for our
selection of inputs and outputs.
Table 1: Summary statistics
Mean Std. Min Max
Joint input Employees 2058.11 1086.31 596.98 5048.93
Private input W. Employees 578.61 447.84 65.81 2758.78
Sew. Employees 545.94 336.52 180.54 2104.31
W. Mains (km) 26290.67 11240.20 7658.44 46573.69
Sew. Mains (km) 30454.65 19627.19 7498.03 83791.43
Output water W. volume (Ml/d) 1253.40 748.96 345.68 2874.31
Sew. volume (Ml/d) 935.92 662.79 229.23 2909.09
Control Service area 12918.93 5824.22 3850.00 22090.00
Leakage 328.56 256.07 72.12 1108.69
River water 0.65 3.43 0.00 45.00
Ground water 0.36 0.74 0.03 9.40
Impound water 0.54 3.49 0.00 45.70
Bulk supply imports 49.00 110.42 0.00 404.49
Bulk supply exports 55.71 98.20 0.00 373.52
Connected water properties 1849.09 1051.34 448.10 3736.40
Connected sewerage properties 2228.86 1358.57 585.00 5737.00
Goodness-of-ﬁt results. Before presenting the results of our goodness-of-ﬁt analysis,
we brieﬂy recall the non-nestedness result that we demonstrated at the end of Section
3. In particular, we showed that CM-rationalizability does not necessarily imply NM-
rationalizability, and vice versa. As such, there is no a priori reason why one model
should have weaker empirical implications (or less discriminatory power) than the other.
In our opinion, this provides a strong motivation for our following exercise, where we
investigate which model eﬀectively does provide the better empirical ﬁt of the production
behavior in the sector under study.
Figure 1 displays the empirical decumulative distribution for our goodness-of-ﬁt (or
eﬃciency) measures introduced in Section 4: it gives the percentage of production obser-
vations t (vertical axis) of which the value of the goodness-of-ﬁt measures CM
t (coopera-
tive model) and NM
t (noncooperative model) equals at least the value on the horizontal
axis. To account for technological shifts, over diﬀerent regulatory cycles, we evaluate a
particular company by (only) comparing it to companies in the same regulatory cycle.
For a given goodness-of-ﬁt value, a better performing model corresponds to a higher per-
centage of ﬁrms that can be rationalized. The overall picture that emerges from Figure
1 is that the noncooperative model outperforms the cooperative model. The diﬀerence is
actually rather pronounced: the distribution for the noncooperative model stochastically
dominates the one for the cooperative model. Interestingly, the diﬀerence also appears
19to be statistically signiﬁcant: if we conduct a two-sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, then
we reject the null hypothesis that the two distributions coincide at a signiﬁcance level of
10% (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic amounts to 0.1316, and the associated p-value
equals 0.075).
Table 2 summarizes the same information in tabulated form; but here we distinguish
between the 4 regulatory cycles captured by our data set. The results in this table
allow for a more detailed analysis. We obtain a median goodness-of-ﬁt value above 93%
for each model speciﬁcation in every regulatory cycle. This shows that, on average,
both models provide a reasonably good ﬁt of the observed production behavior in every
diﬀerent time period. But, again, the noncooperative model systematically dominates
the cooperative model. Even though the diﬀerence is not very substantial in many cases,
it turns out to be quite pronounced in some instances (see, for example, the diﬀerence
between the minimum and ﬁrst quartile values for the two model speciﬁcations). Overall,
the results in Table 2 support the same conclusions as the results in Figure 1.
Generally, our results suggest a better empirical support for the noncooperative model
than for the cooperative model. But the diﬀerence between the goodness-of-ﬁt of the
two models seems to depend on the company (environment) at hand. This directly
brings us to our next exercise, where we relate the (cooperative and noncooperative)
goodness-of-ﬁt values to particular variables describing the production context of every
company that we studied.
Table 2: Goodness-of-ﬁt estimations for each regulatory cycle





0.632 0.864 0.949 0.998 1.000
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noncooperative 0.702 0.878 0.958 1.000 1.000
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Explanatory analysis. To examine the inﬂuence of background factors, we make use
of a two-step approach in which our goodness-of-ﬁt measures are regressed on a num-
ber of observable contextual variables by using both ordinary least squares (OLS) and
tobit (because of the truncated nature of our goodness-of-ﬁt measures). The appro-
priateness of this two-step approach for the type of questions we want to address here
has been advocated in particular by Banker and Natarajan (2008), McDonald (2009)
and Banker (2011) (in a DEA context). Essentially, our following analysis will evaluate
which environmental factors explain the validity of a particular behavioral (coopera-
tive/noncooperative) model for describing the observed production behavior.
As a preliminary note, we emphasize that our following analysis is mainly meant
to be illustrative and should be interpreted as explorative rather than conclusive. This
also explains why we opt for a most simple methodological set-up. In this respect, two
remarks are in order. First, Simar and Wilson (2007) suggested an alternative two-stage
approach for assessing the impact of contextual variables on goodness-of-ﬁt (or eﬃciency)
measures, claiming that this other approach more adequately deals with a number of
statistical issues associated with explanatory analysis such as the one we consider here.
See, for example, Banker and Natarajan (2008), Banker (2011) and Simar and Wilson
(2011) for a comparison between this approach and the one we follow here. At this
21point, we restrict to indicating that our methodology for assessing the goodness-of-ﬁt
of cooperative and noncooperative production models can also easily be combined with
the two-step approach proposed by Simar and Wilson. Second, our following regression
results must be interpreted with suﬃcient care as we do not explicitly correct for possible
endogeneity bias. From this perspective, while we will not always explicitly indicate
this in what follows, our results below actually reveal correlations rather than causal
relationships.
We draw on the existing literature to select our contextual variables (see, for ex-
ample, Stone and Webster (2004)). We consider three speciﬁcations of the regression
model. Our ﬁrst speciﬁcation (model 1) is our base model and includes four explanatory
variables. First, service area ﬁgures as a proxy for the scale of operations. Second,
the percentage of leakage captures the geographical relief (i.e. more hilly landscape re-
quires more pressure on the network of pipes, which could cause leakages more easily)
and the extent of maintenance (i.e. more leakages correspond to less expenses with
maintenance). Third, we assessed water quality information as a potentially important
contextual factor. It is deﬁned in terms of the source of water production: ground wa-
ter has a higher quality and therefore lower puriﬁcation costs than river and impound
water.7
Our second speciﬁcation (model 2) adds water imports and exports to the control
variables. The underlying idea is that companies which import or export water might
be structurally diﬀerent from other companies. A high export of water might indicate
the presence of relatively cheap water or, alternatively, cost disadvantages (especially as
the transportation of water is very expensive). Our third speciﬁcation (model 3) adds
the number of connections as an explanatory variable; this variable can be conceived as
an alternative output measure and ﬁgures as a proxy for the size of the operations. Note
that we allow for cycle ﬁxed eﬀects in our diﬀerent model speciﬁcations, as maximum
prices vary over regulatory cycles. Our main qualitative conclusions are, however, robust
to this ﬁxed eﬀect assumption.8
Table 3 presents the results of our OLS second stage regressions for the three model
speciﬁcations under study. In line with the ﬁndings of Banker and Natarajan (2008)
and McDonald (2009), the estimates for the truncated tobit model are very similar
and therefore omitted (but available upon request). We observe that the sign of the
regression coeﬃcients are generally the same for the cooperative and noncooperative
model speciﬁcations, although the signiﬁcance levels diﬀer for some variables.
If we look at Table 3 in more detail, we ﬁnd for all three model speciﬁcations that
service area is signiﬁcantly negatively correlated with goodness-of-ﬁt: the larger the sup-
ply area, the less rationalizable the production behavior of water utilities (on average).
This negative impact is about the same for the noncooperative model and the coop-
erative model. Furthermore, we observe for the three models that volume of leakage
is positively but (almost always) insigniﬁcantly correlated to cost minimization. The
proportion of river water also seems to have a positive correlation with the (cooperative
7In the regression analysis, we consider impound water as the reference category.
8We note that year ﬁxed eﬀects also deliver robust outcomes.
22and noncooperative) goodness-of-ﬁt. One possible interpretation is that, because it is
more expensive to purify this type of water, a higher dependence on river water urges
utilities to eﬀectively behave eﬃciently (i.e. in a cost minimizing way). An alternative
explanation is that companies save on employee costs if the share of water puriﬁcation in
the price gets higher. Analogous interpretations can explain the negative eﬀect for the
share of ground water. We observe that the source of water explains better goodness-
of-ﬁt for the cooperative model than for the noncooperative model (where it has lower
signiﬁcance, if signiﬁcant at all). This may indicate that companies with a larger propor-
tion of river water act more cooperatively than noncooperatively. This actually seems
intuitive given the higher puriﬁcation costs and, consequently, the higher incentives for
public beneﬁts; in such a case, the costs for these beneﬁts are more easily shared by
both water and sewerage customers.
Let us then consider the speciﬁc variables that have been included in regression mod-
els 2 and 3. First, looking at our results for model 2, which captures water export and
import, we ﬁnd that import does not seem to have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on goodness-
of-ﬁt (for any model speciﬁcation), whereas export apparently does have a signiﬁcantly
positive eﬀect for the noncooperative model: water utilities with a large volume of water
export produce the volume of water and sewerage with proportionally fewer employees
and capital (mains). Finally, we consider our results for model 3. Here we ﬁnd that, in
contrast to the number of sewerage connections (which has a positive but insigniﬁcant
correlation with cost minimization), the number of connected properties for water pro-
vision does appear to have a signiﬁcantly negative impact on cost minimization, which
suggests that smaller scale companies suﬀer less from ineﬃciencies (i.e. behavior incon-
sistent with cost minimization). This last ﬁnding falls in line with the existing literature,
which indeed suggests diseconomies of scale for water utilities that have about the same
size as the E&W companies that we study here (see Berg and Marques (2010) for a
literature review of the water sector).
From these results, we can draw the overall conclusion that some of the variables
we selected seem particularly related with the cooperative or noncooperative model.
For example, the proportion of river water correlates signiﬁcantly with goodness-of-ﬁt
only for the cooperative model, and the proportion of ground water shows a stronger
correlation for the cooperative model than for the noncooperative model. Our ﬁnal
regression exercise allows us to investigate these patterns a little bit further. Speciﬁcally,
we now take the diﬀerence between the cooperative and noncooperative goodness-of-ﬁt
measures as the dependent variable, while using the same contextual factors (and related
model speciﬁcations) as before.
The results are presented in Table 4. For models 1 and 2, we ﬁnd that in particular the
proportion of river and ground water abstraction explains the diﬀerence in goodness-
of-ﬁt between the cooperative and noncooperative models. The larger the proportion
of the more costly river water abstraction, the better the observed production behav-
ior is explained by the cooperative (centralized) model (relative to the noncooperative
model). Intuitively, this can be explained by cross-subsidies between the departments
that are necessary to compensate the more expensive water source, or by an exchange
23of know-how on water puriﬁcation. The larger the proportion of the cheaper (in terms
of puriﬁcation) ground water, the more noncooperatively (i.e. decentralized) companies
seem to act. Intuitively, in this case the water source is already relatively pure, and
so there is less need for cooperation. In Model 2, the service area explains the coop-
erative model: the larger the service area, the more companies cooperate. The volume
of bulk supply exports rationalizes the non-cooperative model better than the cooper-
ative model. The more water exports, the better the observed production behavior is
explained by the noncooperative model. The other speciﬁc variables of model 3 seem
to have roughly the same eﬀect on the goodness-of-ﬁt for the two speciﬁcations under
study. The assumption of ﬁxed eﬀects associated with the diﬀerent regulatory cycles
does not change this conclusion.
Summarizing, we believe this application clearly illustrates the kind of questions
that can be addressed by using the newly proposed methodology. First, our nonpara-
metric toolkit allows for checking whether the noncooperative or cooperative model best
describes the observed multi-output production behavior. A second stage regression
analysis may then investigate which environmental factors drive the appropriateness of
a speciﬁc behavioral (cooperative/noncooperative) model. In our application, we did
identify a number of such contextual factors that seem to signiﬁcantly impact on the
goodness-of-ﬁt of both the cooperative and noncooperative models. Moreover, we were
able to distinguish factors that speciﬁcally drive the better ﬁt of one particular model.
Table 3: Regressing goodness-of-ﬁt on contextual variables for cooperative and nonco-
operative models
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Dependent variable coop noncoop coop noncoop coop noncoop
Constant 9.671E-01*** 1.009E+00*** 9.666E-01*** 1.014E+00*** 9.613E-01*** 1.003E+00***
2.756E-02 2.359E-02 2.834E-02 2.372E-02 2.771E-02 2.351E-02
Service area -3.452E-06** -3.893E-06*** -4.047E-06** -5.131E-06*** -2.128E-06 -2.450E-06*
1.131E-06 9.683E-07 1.348E-06 1.128E-06 1.283E-06 1.089E-06
Leakage 2.569E-05 3.649E-05 2.966E-05 3.813E-05 1.068E-04 1.227E-04*
2.667E-05 2.283E-05 2.686E-05 2.248E-05 6.493E-05 5.508E-05
Proportion river water 1.502E-02** 7.087E-03 1.230E-02* 3.799E-03 1.684E-02* 9.207E-03
5.308E-03 4.544E-03 5.375E-03 4.497E-03 6.471E-03 5.489E-03
Proportion ground water -9.230E-02*** -5.333E-02* -7.866E-02** -3.663E-02 -1.018E-01** -6.437E-02*
2.506E-02 2.146E-02 2.545E-02 2.129E-02 3.090E-02 2.621E-02
Bulk supply imports -6.401E-05 -4.176E-05
6.185E-05 5.176E-05
Bulk supply exports 1.418E-04 2.098E-04**
7.536E-05 6.306E-05
Connected water properties -3.996E-05* -4.370E-05*
2.021E-05 1.714E-05
Connected sewerage properties 1.194E-05 1.353E-05
1.587E-05 1.347E-05
Regulatory cycle ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Standard errors below. ***, **, and * denote signiﬁcance at, respectively, 1, 5 and 10%-level.
24Table 4: Regressing the diﬀerence in goodness-of-ﬁt (cooperative - noncooperative) on
contextual variables
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Dependent variable coop-noncoop coop-noncoop coop-noncoop
Constant -4.170E-02*** -4.699E-02*** -4.136E-02***
1.082E-02 1.114E-02 1.104E-02
Service area 4.412E-07 1.084E-06* 3.222E-07
4.443E-07 5.299E-07 5.113E-07
Leakage -1.080E-05 -8.475E-06 -1.593E-05
1.048E-05 1.056E-05 2.587E-05
Proportion river water 7.932E-03*** 8.501E-03*** 7.636E-03**
2.085E-03 2.112E-03 2.578E-03
Proportion ground water -3.897E-02*** -4.203E-02*** -3.748E-02**
9.845E-03 1.000E-02 1.231E-02
Bulk supply imports -2.226E-05
2.431E-05
Bulk supply exports -6.801E-05*
2.962E-05
Connected water properties 3.742E-06
8.052E-06
Connected sewerage properties -1.589E-06
6.324E-06
Regulatory cycle ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Note: Standard errors below. ***, **, and * denote signiﬁcance at, respectively, 1, 5 and 10%-level.
256 Conclusion
We have presented a novel framework for analyzing multi-output production behavior.
Such behavior typically involves jointly used inputs, which raises the issue of whether
these joint inputs are allocated in a cooperative (centralized) or noncooperative (de-
centralized) way. We introduced a methodology to empirically analyze multi-output
production behavior in terms of the cooperative model and the noncooperative model.
A distinguishing feature of our methodology is that it is nonparametric in nature, which
means that it avoids imposing prior (nonveriﬁable) functional structure on the produc-
tion technology.
An empirical application to the English and Welsh drinking water and sewerage sec-
tor demonstrated the practical usefulness of our framework. Here, a speciﬁc focus was
on assessing (and comparing) the goodness-of-ﬁt of the two model speciﬁcations for this
particular sector. We found that the noncooperative model systematically provided a
better description of the production behavior in our sample. Subsequently, an explana-
tory analysis allowed us to identify a number of company-speciﬁc contextual factors that
signiﬁcantly correlate with our goodness-of-ﬁt measures for both models. Moreover, our
data did enable us to distinguish particular factors that speciﬁcally seem to drive the
better ﬁt of one model (but not the other). In particular, we found that the behavior of
companies with a higher proportion of river water abstraction, which is a more expen-
sive resource to purify, is better explained by the cooperative model. On the contrary,
companies with a higher proportion of ground water act more in line with the nonco-
operative model. Moreover, we observed that a larger service area explains cooperative
behavior, while an increasing volume of bulk supply exports explains the noncooperative
model.
We see diﬀerent avenues for follow-up research. First, to focus our analysis we
have only considered characterizing multi-output production under (cooperative and
noncooperative) cost minimization, and empirically assessing the goodness-of-ﬁt of al-
ternative model speciﬁcations. If observed production behavior is found consistent with
a particular model (i.e. can be rationalized), then interesting next questions pertain
to recovering/identifying the decision model (including the production technology) that
underlies the (rationalizable) production behavior, and to forecasting/simulating produc-
tion behavior in new situations (e.g. characterized by new input prices and/or output
levels). Nonparametric recovery and forecasting issues have been addressed in the case
of single-output production (see, for example, the original contributions of Hanoch and
Rothschild (1972), Afriat (1972), Diewert and Parkan (1983) and Varian (1984)). As
indicated above, our newly proposed methodology naturally extends existing tools for
assessing single-output production. Given this, it provides a useful basis for develop-
ing the multi-output generalizations of recovery and forecasting tools that apply to the
single output case.
Second, referring to our discussion in the Introduction, we believe it is interesting to
further exploit the formal link with models for multi-person household consumption, to
develop novel tools for analyzing multi-output production. Speciﬁcally, existing contri-
butions on parametric analysis of multi-person consumption can provide a fruitful basis
26for developing the parametric counterpart of the nonparametric framework we set out
here. In turn, this may imply useful multi-output extensions of the parametric eﬃciency
measurement literature commonly referred to as Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA).
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 2
(necessity) In order to demonstrate necessity we begin by introducing some notation.
We denote the input vector, which solves OP-CM, as an element of R
J N M
    Ω , by
stacking all the output-speciﬁc inputs q
j
t on top of each other and ending with the joint
inputs Qt. We denote this vector by  t:










Similarly, any other vector     Ω  is decomposed as
     x





Likewise, we denote price vectors by elements in the set R
J N M
     Ω  , which are
obtained by replicating the price vectors pt (J times) and ending with the vector Pt.
Let  t represent this vector
 t    pt ::: pt Pt :
Consider a convex set S and an element a   S. The normal cone of S at the point
a is denoted by C a S  and is deﬁned as
C a S     w  x   S;w x   a      :
29Now, consider an output j and the input requirement set V j yj . We deﬁne the set




t         Ω   x




Fact 1. The set   V j y
j
t  is convex.
Proof. Assume that   and   are in   V j y
j
t  and let      ;  . Let                .
Then  xj;X    V j y
j
t ,  yj;Y    V j y
j
t , zj   xj      yj and Z   X     Y.
By convexity of the set V j y
j
t , we obtain that  zj;Z    V j y
j
t  and we can conclude
that       V j y
j
t .
Fact 2. Let  j   C  t   V j y
j
t   (i.e.  j is in the normal cone of   V j y
j
t  at  t), where







Then, it must be that
• for all k ̸  j, uk
j   0,
• u
j
j   0,
• Uj   0.
Proof. Let       V j y
j
t  be equal to  t except for  xk m  k ̸  j;m   N , where
 x
k m    q
j
t m   ;
We consider values of       ";"  for a small number " >  . Clearly,       V j y
j
t  for all
possible values of . Then, if  j is normal to   V j y
j
t  at  t, it must be that
 j     j t
   u
k
j m x










k m   
)
:
Setting  >   shows that  uk
j m    . On the other hand, if  <  , then  uk
j m    .
As such, if the condition must hold for all  in the interval, it must be that  uk
j m    .
Given that m and k were arbitrarily chosen (except for the fact that k ̸  j), it follows
that for all k ̸  j, uk
j   0.
Now, consider a vector   which equals  t except for the element  xj m, where
 x
j m    q
j
t m   :
Here, we have to assume  >  , since otherwise we can no longer guarantee that    
  V j y
j
t . By monotonicity of the set V j y
j
t , we see that  xj;X    V j y
j
t . As such,
      V j y
j
t . Now, if  j is normal to   V j y
j














j m   
)
:
This shows that  u
j
j m    . As m was arbitrarily chosen, we see that u
j
j   0. Straight-
forwardly, we can conduct a similar reasoning with respect to the vector Qt in order to
show that that the vector Uj   0.
30Given the deﬁnition of the sets   V j y
j
t , we see that the cost minimization program
OP-CM can be rewritten as:
   
  Ω+
 t  s.t.       V
j y
j
t    j   J :
The sets   V j y
j
t  are convex. Hence, a necessary and suﬃcient condition for  t to be a
solution to this problem is that there exist vectors  j in C  t   V j y
j
t   such that9




By Fact 2, we have that  j is of the form
 j    0 ::: u
j
j ::: 0 Uj ;
where u
j
j   0 and Uj   0. Then, we can rewrite the equilibrium conditions as
pt    u
j
j;




Further, given that  j is a normal vector for the set   V j y
j
t , we must have that for all
      V j y
j
t :
 j      t     :
Let us deﬁne P
j
t    Uj, which gives a solution for condition 2 of Theorem 2. Given the




j   q
j
t    P
j
t X   Q     :
Now, consider an observation v such that yj
v   y
j
t. As t is rationalizable, we have
that  qj
v;Qv    V j y
j
t . As such, we obtain
ptq
j
v   P
j
tQv   ptq
j




v   y
j
t:
This shows the ﬁrst part of condition 3 of Theorem 2 (or equivalently the ﬁrst condition
of SACM).
The second condition part of condition 3 of Theorem 2 can be established by using




t, which implies that  qj
v;Qv    V j y
j
t . By continuity and strict
monotonicity of fj, there exists a  <  , such that  qj
v;Qv    V j y
j
t , and therefore
ptq
j
t   PtQt   ptq
j
v   PtQv < ptq
j
v   PtQv:
(suﬃciency) Let us ﬁx the observation t. We proceed by constructing for every output
j, a production function fj which will rationalize the data.
Towards this end, consider the output j. For every observation v   T    t , let Cj
v
be the convex hull of all vectors  qj
s;Qs  with yj
s   yj
v. We denote by Rj the collection
of all observations v   T    t  for which  qj
v;Qv  is not in the interior of Cj
v.
9See, for example Rockafellar (1970, p. 283)
31Fact 3. For each of the elements v   Rj, there exist vectors wj   RN







v   W
j




z   W
j
vQz   z   T with y
j













z   W
j





Proof. This follows from the separating hyperplane theorem and the fact that the pro-
duction functions are strictly increasing and continuous.
Now, we construct an artiﬁcial data set Kj such that




t;Qt  is in Kj,
• for all v   Rj, the observation  wj
v;Wj
v;qj
v;Qv  is in Kj.
Fact 4. The data set Kj satisﬁes the generalized axiom of revealed preference (GARP).10
Proof. This follows from the fact that Kj satisﬁes SACM for all observations (if t is
rationalizable) and the fact that this is a stronger condition than GARP.




v (v   Rj) and strict positive numbers 
j
t, j
v (v   Rj) such that, for all v;s   Rj,
U
j
v   U
j








v   q
j
s    W
j





t   U
j








t   q
j
v    W
j





v   U
j






v   q
j
t    P
j
t Qv   Qt 
]
:
Furthermore, it is possible to impose that yj
v < yj
s if and only if Uj
v < Uj
s (for all
v;s   Rj   t ). As such, we can plot the values of Uj
s against the corresponding values
of yj
s (s   Rj    t ) in a graph, and connect the dots. We call this function gj (i.e. for
all s   Rt    t , yj
s   gj Uj
s ). The function gj is strictly increasing and, therefore, one
to one and invertible. Let hj be the inverse of gj.
Now, we construct the function Uj xj;X  deﬁned by
U
j x
j;X       
{
   v Rj  Uj
v   j
v  wv xj   qj
v    Wj
v X   Qv    
U
j




pt xj   q
j
t    P
j




This function is concave (as it is the minimum of a ﬁnite set of linear functions),
strictly increasing, and satisﬁes Uj qj
s;Qs    Uj
s (for all s   Rj    t ). Given the
function Uj : , we deﬁne the production function fj :  by
f
j x




Observe that for all s   Rj  t , fj qj
s;Qs    yj
s, and that the function fj is continuous,
strictly monotonic, and quasi-concave (as it is a strictly monotonic transformation of a
strictly monotonic and concave function).
10See, for example, Varian (1982) for a discussion of GARP.
32We can repeat the above procedure for every output j    ;:::;J, creating the functions
f ;:::;fJ. Let us show that observation t solves OP-CM for these production functions.
We do this ad absurdum. Speciﬁcally, we assume that there exist inputs xj and X such
that
∑











































j   q
j
t    P
j












By the pigeonhole principle, we see that for at least one j   J, it must be the case that
Uj xj;X  < U
j
t . This implies fj xj;X  < y
j
t, which gives the desired contradiction.
The only thing we still need to establish is that, for all v   T, fj qj
v;Qv    yj
v. If
v   Rj    t , we have that fj qj
v;Qv    yj
v, by construction. On the other hand, if
v =   Rj   t , then  qj
v;Qv  can be written as the convex combination of vectors  qj
s;Qs 
for which yj
s   yj
v. In fact, we can restrict ourselves to observations s in Rj. As such, we
have that for all these observations s, fj qj
s;Qs    yj
s   yj
v. The result fj qj
v;Qv    yj
v
follows from quasi-concavity of the function fj.
Proof of Theorem 3
(necessity) As a preliminary step, we note that the problem OP-NM can be rewritten
as
   
xj;Xj ptx
j   P
jX s.t.  xj;X    V  y
j






Analogous to the proof of Theorem 2, consider the space Ω    RN M+, with typical
element   given as




We denote by  
j
t, which contains the solutions of OP-NM, the vector
 
j






and by   the vector
     p P :
As before, let C a S  be the normal cone of a convex set S at the point a   S.
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33Fact 5. The set   W j is convex.
Now, consider the normal cone C  t    W j . We obtain the following fact about its
elements:
Fact 6. Let  j   C  t    W j , with






j   0,
• if  Qt m >
∑
k̸ j Qk
t m, then  Rj m    ,
• if  Qt m  
∑
k̸ j Qk
t m, then  Rj m    .
Proof. Let   be the vector in Ω  which equals  
j
t except for the element  xj m with
 x
j m    q
j
t m   :
Here we take       ";"  for some small " >  . We see that       W j. Then, if  j is in
the normal cone of   W j at  
j
t, it follows that
 j     j 
j
t
   r
j
j  x










j m   
)
:
This must hold for all  in the interval, and hence,  u
j
j m    . As m was arbitrarily
chosen, we must have that r
j
j   0. If  Qt m >
∑
k̸ j Qk
t m, we can use a similar
reasoning to show that  Rj m    .
Then, consider the case where  Qt m  
∑
k̸ j Qk
t m and assume that the vector  
equals  
j
t except for the element  X m, which is given by
 X m    Qt m   :
Here, we have to take  >   to guarantee that the vector   is in   W j. Then, if  j is in
the normal cone of   W j at  
j
t, it follows that
 Rj m X m    Rj m Qt m    Rj m   X m    :
This can only be the case when  Rj m    .
Fact 7. Let  j   C  t V j y
j
t , with






j   0,
• Uj   0.
Proof. The proof of this is very similar to the proof of Fact 6.
The optimization problem can be written as
   
  Ω+
   s.t.     V
j y
j
t  and       W
j:
Again using Rockafellar (1970), we have that a necessary and suﬃcient condition
for a solution of this problem is that there exist vectors  j   C  
j
t V j y
j
t   and  j  
C  
j
t    W j  such that




j   pt;
 Uj   Pt   Rj:
Let us deﬁne P
j
t    Uj   0, which gives a solution for condition 2 of Theorem 3. As
 j is in the normal cone of V j y
j
t  at  
j




j   q
j
t    P
j
t X   Qt     :
Now, if yj
v   y
j
t, it must be that  qj
v;Qv    V j y
j
t  and, therefore,
pt q
j
v   q
j
t    P
j
t Qv   Qt     :
This shows the ﬁrst part of condition 3 of Theorem 3 (or equivalently the ﬁrst condition
of SACM). The second part of condition 3 of Theorem 3 can be established by using
continuity of fj (just like for Theorem 2).
Also, because  Qt m >   for all m, it must be that there is at least one j such that
 Qt m >
∑
j̸ k Qk
t m, i.e, there must be at least one j such that  Q
j
t m >  . For this j
it follows that  Rj m     and therefore  P
j
t m    Pt m. Else, if
∑
j̸ k Qk
t m    Qt m,
we have that  Rj m     and therefore,  P
j
t m    Pt m. From this, it follows that




t m    Pt m:
(suﬃciency) Fix an observation t. As in the proof of Theorem 3, we construct the set Rj
of observations such that, for all v   Rj, there exist vectors wj   RN
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vQz   z   T y
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Next, we construct the artiﬁcial data set Kj such that
35•  pt;Pt;q
j
t;Qt  is in Kj,
• for all v   Rj,  wv;Wv;qv;Qv  is in Kj.
Fact 8. The data set Kj satisﬁes GARP.




v (v   Rj) and strict positive numbers 
j
t, j
v (v   Rj) such that, for all v;s   Rj,
U
j
v   U
j
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s    W
j
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v   U
j






v   q
j
t    P
j
t Qv   Qt 
]
:
We can plot the corresponding values of Uj
s against yj
s (s   Rj   t ) in a graph and
connect the dots, calling this function gj (i.e. for all s   Rj    t , yj
s   gj Uj
s ). This
function is strictly increasing and, therefore, one to one and invertible. Let hj be the
inverse of gj.
Now, for each j   J consider the function Uj qj;Q  deﬁned by
U
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This functions is concave, strictly increasing, and satisﬁes Uj qj
s;Qs    Uj
s for all
s   T j    t . Then, deﬁne fj qj;Q    gj Uj qj;Q  ). For all s   T j    t  we
have fj qj
s;Qs    yj
s, and the function fj is continuous, strictly monotonic, and quasi-
concave. We can repeat this procedure for all outputs j, so obtaining the functions
f ;:::;fJ.
Next, let us show that observation t solves OP-NM. For all j   J, if  P
j
t m <  Pt m,
we set  Q
j
t m     and if  P
j
t m    Pt m we set  Q
j





t m    Qt m.
We prove the wanted result ad absurdum. Speciﬁcally, we assume that there exist




t and fj xj;Xj  
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Observe that our construction is such that Pj
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36This implies fj xj;Xj  
∑
k̸ j Qk
t  < y
j
t, a contradiction.
The only thing we still need to establish is that, for all v   T, fj qj
v;Qv    yj
v. If
v   Rj  t , we have fj qj
v;Qv    yj
v by construction. On the other hand, if v =   Rj  t ,
then  qj
v;Qv  can be written as the convex combination of vectors  qj
s;Qs  in Rj (for
which fj qj
s;Qs    yj
s   yj
v). The result fj qj
v;Qv    yj
v follows from quasi-concavity of
the function fj.
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